10 July 2002

As the increases in US defence spending begin to take effect, we are starting to see the longer-term effects of 11 September on the US military posture. Some of the changes are in evidence in other countries and they are joined by another factor that complicates US defence thinking – the resolute determination of the Russian arms industry to rescue itself from collapse by a vigorous arms export policy.

On the US side, there are two basic factors that are working to change the military posture. One is the development of new means of fighting wars by remote control and the other is the need to develop defences against what are termed asymmetric threats.

The whole environment is summed up by a remarkable phrase spoken by George Bush that dates back to his election campaign in January 2000. Contrasting the relative certainties of the cold war era with the more complicated world that the US now faced, he commented:

“...it was a dangerous world and we knew exactly who the ‘they’ were. It was us versus them and we knew exactly who them was. Today we’re not so sure who the ‘they’ are, but we know they’re there.”

“They” now comprise al-Qaida and several other paramilitary organisations operating across the world, and a series of rogue states including Iraq, Iran and North Korea. These not only threaten US interests overseas, but also, since 9/11, the United States itself.

Heightened threat, intensified security

At the centre of the US response to the new world disorder is a comprehensive rethink on domestic security or ‘homeland defence’. This is only partly due to the New York and Washington attacks, but is complicated by the anthrax incidents of last autumn, still unresolved but with the finger pointing at a source connected to the US bio-defence establishment.

The requirements for homeland defence will eventually entail some radical changes in the FBI, CIA and other agencies, but the perceived need for protection is such that there is a deep reluctance to go for root and branch reform at a time of threat.

More generally, there has had to be a comprehensive rethink about airline and airport security. Homeland air defence was of minimal concern before last September, and almost no thought had been given to protection from air attacks generated within the US.

For almost the whole of the cold war, US air defences were aimed at perimeter defence, and most of these were cut back when the Soviet Union collapsed. Much of the emergency response has had to be generated from Air National Guard and other reserve units, but this has been at a time when there have been heavy demands overseas.

The end result will be a costly expansion of continental air defences coupled with the development of forces designed to handle paramilitary attacks using chemical, biological or radiological attacks to match the Nuclear Emergency Search Teams that already exist to respond to nuclear attacks.

Two other aspects of the new world disorder are the premium placed on the protection of US diplomatic missions overseas, and the sudden need to offer much greater protection to US armed forces abroad. On the diplomatic side, there has been a withdrawal of many diplomats from the more dangerous regions, and the turning of missions into near-fortresses.

The US embassy in Grosvenor Square in London is one example, but it is matched on a smaller scale by increased security at bases such as Menwith Hill in North Yorkshire, Fairford in Gloucestershire and Lakenheath in Sussex.

The levels of security are partly in response to 9/11 but also go back to the East African embassy bombs, and the attacks on the Khobar Towers barracks in Saudi Arabia and the USS Cole in Aden harbour. The bomb attempt against the US consulate in Karachi last month was a remarkably destructive bomb, but it did relatively little damage to the building because of the level of protection.

Even so, one of the features of the perceived and actual threats to US interests is the manner in which it has required a wholesale rethink of security attitudes. Nowhere is this more clear than in the case of warships.

For the US navy and its Western counterparts, surface warships have been all about delivering firepower against other warships, including submarines or against land targets. As a result, powerful anti-aircraft, anti-submarine and land attack missile systems have been developed, and the warships have, in turn, been equipped with the means to defend themselves from major threats.

Indeed, the land attack function has received a major boost from the requirement to be able to attack targets deep inland with precision. The end result has been a range of cruise missiles and accurate long-range guns all designed to support wider operations against threats, with the US using cruise missiles in attacks against sites in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Bosnia, Kosovo and Serbia in recent years.

What was not widely recognised until the attack on the USS Cole was that hugely powerful warships, costing up to a billion dollars a time, could be vulnerable to attacks from tiny semi-rigid speedboats crewed by determined paramilitaries.

In response to this, and the recent indications of al-Qaida anti-ship activity in Morocco, there has been a rush to equip warships with simple and often crude defensive measures, including machine guns that would have been considered entirely irrelevant in previous circumstances. Moreover, there has been a complete rethink on port security, with severe restrictions on US warships using foreign ports and a greater reliance on refuelling and replenishment at sea.

This reaction by the US navy parallels an existing preoccupation with security by US army and air force personnel throughout the Middle East and South-West Asia. Base security is now a prime feature of deployments and one aspect of this is the manner in which severe restrictions are placed on US personnel in terms of rest and recreation. This, in turn, is leading to problems of morale. The old days of joining the military and seeing the world are now long gone – what is much more common is seeing the inside of a heavily guarded camp accompanied by forays in well-protected patrols.

Limiting US power: the Russia/China axis

The overall impact of the attacks last September has therefore been to reinforce a feeling of potential vulnerability to diverse, unpredictable and often hidden threats. It is an uncomfortable environment for a state that is otherwise such a remarkable superpower, and gives the lie to the perception that control is being maintained with little difficulty.

An added complication for the US military has been the recent determination of Russia to save its defence industries by way of an intensive export drive. In some cases, this involves licensed production overseas, with China being an obvious example.

China currently produces about 20 Su-27 fighters a year under licence from Russia in a deal dating back to 1996, and a further deal, three years later, resulted in the purchase of a substantial quantity (perhaps 80) of the Su-30, a long-range version of the Su-27. Moreover, this advanced strike aircraft will also be produced in quantity in China.

This kind of production and acquisition will give China a substantial high-tech weapons production capability, enabling it to sell on weapons and equipment to other states, including those considered by Washington to be a threat.

Another example is Russia’s development of a new class of diesel-electric submarine, the Amur 1650. The first of these, the St Petersburg, will be launched next year and may be leased to the impoverished Russian navy. It is patently obvious, though, that the longer-term aim is to develop a thriving export market based on the previous experience with Kilo-class submarines that have been sold to a number of countries including India, China and Iran.

According to a recent report in the International Defence Review, the Amur design will have a noise signature barely one-tenth of that of the Kilo, and will be available in a range of different forms. It will be a class of submarines particularly suited to shallow waters such as the Persian Gulf, and its export will be pursued with alacrity.

In their different ways, these kinds of projects serve as a potential limitation on US global capabilities, with the Russia/China axis being particularly significant.

At the same time, and in an apparent paradox, they are not unwelcome to defence industries in the United States and Europe. This is for the simple, if somewhat perverse, reason that any such development that limits US and European defence capabilities requires an answer, and that answer inevitably comes with a pretty heavy price tag.

Throughout the cold war, diverse Western military projects were fuelled by the perceived need to counter relevant Soviet threats. Now we are in an era where, at first sight, hugely expensive projects, such as Eurofighter and the American F-22, are hardly relevant in the war on terror.

Fortunately for the manufacturers of such projects, the newly capitalist Russia has come to their rescue with a desperate need to save its defence industries. It seeks to do this by exporting advanced products, which may well fall into the hands of questionable regimes. This then helps to provide a series of ready threats, which boost the West’s military/industrial complex. It isn’t quite as perfect as selling to both sides in a conflict but almost as good.

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