Three events in the past few
weeks combine to give us an unusually clear indication of US security policy in
the coming years. Two occurred last week and are obvious; the third happened on
1 October and is far less well known.
The first event was that the Republican
party made small but highly significant gains in the mid-term Congressional
elections on 5 November. Against the usual trends, it took seats from the
Democrats, gaining a majority in the Senate and giving George W. Bush the
veritable command of the US political system. By concentrating on international
issues, not least the US war on terror and the impending attack on Iraq, Bush
successfully sidelined questions of the economy and financial probity.
This certainly makes war with
Iraq much more likely, but also gives George W. Bush a considerable boost for
the 2004 Presidential election. With Jeb Bush triumphant in Florida, we might
yet see sixteen years of a Bush White House. Quite a thought…
The second event last week was
the use of an armed drone in Yemen to execute a suspected al-Qaida leader
together with five of his companions. This was a CIA operation, probably
conducted with Yemeni government cooperation, but it was still an attack that
carried the war against al-Qaida and its associates to a new level – summary
execution of a suspect and his associates, one of them a US citizen, without
trial and in a third country.
This was no more than an
example of the US strategy of pre-emption, itself not that new – bearing in
mind previous conflicts in Vietnam, Central America and elsewhere – but
certainly an escalation in the current war.
The third event goes back to
the beginning of October and went unnoticed outside the specialist defence
press. This was the amalgamation
of two US military commands into a single US Strategic Command (Stratcom). The
old Stratcom, with its long-standing nuclear-orientated posture, swallowed up
the seventeen-year-old US Space Command, concerned with joint military
operations in space.
This might seem a small move,
perhaps just a matter of bureaucratic re-organisation, but what lies behind it
is the deeply-held belief that the United States must have full command of
space, and that this is best done by a single command that combines offensive
and defensive operations. In particular, the new Stratcom is likely to maintain
prime responsibility for global strike, together with missile defence and
diverse military operations in space.
The significance of this
development becomes clear when it is put together with the recently published US
National Security Strategy, which emphasised the absolute need to maintain
control of a potentially unstable international system.
The US objective: total
security
At the core of the thinking
behind the new strategy of
the US are four key claims.
The first claim is that it should be seen as a mission for the United
States in the 21st century to ensure that the world is shaped in its political
and economic image.
The second claim is that states or movements that resist this mission
are a threat both to the United States and its allies and to the world as a
whole.
The third claim is that it may be necessary to pre-empt the rise to
power of such states or movements.
The fourth claim is that this requires, among other things, the need
for the United States to maintain the world’s strongest military forces and
that they must be technologically superior to those of any possible enemy,
either now or in the years to come.
Beyond all this is another
aspect of the US security posture – its complete transparency. President Bush
has been absolutely clear and to the point, especially since 9/11. There is no
disguising that there is an axis of evil, in relation to which ‘you are either
for us or against us’. Moreover, actions back up these statements as US forces
continue to operate in Afghanistan, build new bases in Central Asia, kill
suspects in Yemen, support counter-insurgency forces in many countries and
continue with the military build-up in the Gulf.
President Bush himself put it
clearly in his speech
to West Point graduates last June:
‘Our security will require
transforming the military you will lead – a military that must be ready to
strike at a moment’s notice in any dark corner of the world.’
Put bluntly, Bush’s security
advisers believe implicitly that the best way they can make their putative
opponents refrain from challenging the United States, whether these be states
or paramilitary groups, is to be unequivocally open in their intentions.
Opposition will not be tolerated.
This approach goes well beyond
current military dispositions and operations. The formation of the new Stratcom
means a commitment to missile defence alongside very strong offensive
capabilities. US air-launched cruise missiles can now span the Earth and, in a
few years time, space-based lasers and other new systems will be even more
effective. Nowhere on Earth will be secure from actions needed to ensure US
safety.
The global consequence:
insecurity and resistance
From the US side, all this is
clear-cut and repeated with loud insistence. Yet what it fails completely to
appreciate is the view from the other side.
Take Iran as an example. This
is a state in the midst of a prolonged tussle between conservative clerics and
modernisers. It is quietly and persistently being courted by many European
governments. For the Bush administration, though, Iran is a rogue state,
clearly part of the ‘axis of evil’.
In the face of this attitude,
the Iranians look at the United States in the knowledge that the latter’s
forces could target any barracks, air base, factory or even house anywhere in
Iran, and destroy it with air-launched cruise missiles – and do so with
impunity. Using stealth bombers, the country’s electricity supply system could
be destroyed, its bridges, main roads and railways rendered useless, and there
is nothing the Iranians could do about it. The Iranians, after all, will have
seen such targeting in use repeatedly, not least in Iraq and Serbia.
Similarly, paramilitary groups
and radical social movements know that US forces will act anywhere they think
necessary, with or without the support of local governments. It is all clear,
obvious and out in the open.
But there is, of course, a
catch in all of this: namely, that the policy itself is likely to prove deeply
and persistently counter-productive. For a state such as Iran, and for at least
half a dozen others, a US state policy of this kind, with its parallel military
power, makes it far more necessary to acquire deterrent forces, whether these
be missiles or biological, chemical or nuclear weapons. True, they will have to
be produced in conditions of great secrecy, but in the face of US military
power they will be seen as essential – they will become the weapons of the
underdog.
We therefore end up in the
extraordinary position that US attempts to control opposition by military means
will simply encourage opponents to redouble their efforts to protect themselves
and deter such attacks. They will be aided by many states that may not be implicitly
opposed to the US but are more than happy to aid those who see themselves as
threatened. Serbia may aid Iraq with upgraded radar systems, China may help
Iraq with military communications and Pakistan with its nuclear programme.
Pakistan, in turn, may help North Korea with nuclear facilities, and North
Korea is meanwhile in the business of selling missiles to Syria and Iran.
Nor will such processes be
curbed by various arms control agreements, not least because the United States
itself now regards such agreements as almost entirely redundant.
Furthermore, states facing the
United States and its allies will do everything they can in order not to have
to face the direct use of military power. Every asymmetric warfare method
available, whether it be sabotage, paramilitary attacks, support for radical
movements or any other tactic – all will be seen as essential for their own
security.
On 11 September 2001, al-Qaida
found one weak point, exploited it with remarkable ability and executed it with
terrible consequences. Since then, al-Qaida has dispersed, it has resisted
every attempt to destroy it, it is emerging with most, if not all, of its
capabilities intact, and it seems to have as much support as ever.
The end result of the Bush
security posture is to establish a broadly-based ‘us versus them’ polarisation,
in the belief that this is the only way to ensure the New American Century. In
practice it encourages exactly the opposite – a widespread and growing
opposition in which every means will be found to counter US power. In such a
situation, the United States itself will actually end up less secure, although
it may take years for this to be recognised.