11 April 2002
Israel’s strategy: the impotence of arms
Paul Rogers
The real purpose of Israel’s military assault on the Palestinian Authority is to systematically destroy its ability to function as a state. By pursuing the logic of force, Ariel Sharon’s government is putting Israel’s security at serious risk.
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As the
Israeli military attacks on the West Bank continue, their full aim is becoming
apparent. It fits in closely with Ariel Sharon’s longer-term policies, has
little to do with curbing suicide bombers, and has serious implications for the
region as a whole and the security of Israel in particular.
It is probable that the entire operation was
originally intended to take about four weeks, with rather more than half of
that involving intense military actions in cities and towns throughout the West
Bank. The climax of the operation would come with protracted assaults in Gaza,
including the occupation of the densely populated Palestinian refugee camps.
There was an expectation that the United States
would not intervene early enough to limit the full extent of the military
operations, but this has been turned on its head by the intense pressure on
Washington from a number of Arab states. The most notable of these have been
Egypt and Jordan, not least as their own populations respond to the “Al-Jazeera”
factor – the widespread and persistent reporting of the Israeli actions on
independent satellite TV news channels.
At the time of writing (10 April), large-scale
military operations have not commenced in Gaza. If they do, then the fighting
will stretch over at least a week and will be of an intensity exceeding that of
Nablus, Jenin and Bethlehem. It will be a disaster for the United States and
will further inflame tensions across the Middle East.
However, if Sharon is holds back from going into
Gaza then his full intentions will not have been achieved. Moreover, Hamas,
which draws much of its strength from communities in Gaza, will see its
position enhanced within the Palestinian community.
Israel’s
real purpose
If one thing is well nigh certain about the intense
conflict of the past two weeks, it is that the purpose is not to curtail the
risk of suicide bombing. That is not something that can be done by blanket
military operations against centres of Palestinian population. Indeed it is
very much more likely to produce further generations of potential suicide
bombers.
The military operations actually have a quite
different purpose, and this has become clear as the effects of the war have
become apparent. They are, in short, aimed at destroying the capacity of a
putative Palestinian state to operate.
Information on the impact of the Israeli attacks
remains extremely limited, as journalists have been prevented from reporting
from within the Palestinian areas, but some reports have seeped out. Firstly,
it is probable that casualties have been high, with several hundreds killed on
the Palestinian side, and many more seriously injured. Secondly, there has been
a systematic process of dismantling the apparatus of the Palestine National
Authority.
Much of the military action has been directed
against the police and security forces of the PNA, with substantial numbers
having been killed and many hundreds taken into custody. Police stations and
barracks have been destroyed, as have intelligence and security centres.
Moreover, and in some ways much more significant, there has been the
destruction of the PNA’s administrative infrastructure.
Information on this remains incomplete but is
sufficient to show that there has been widespread destruction of offices and
facilities of PNA ministries and Palestinian non-governmental organisations.
The Ministry of Local Government and the Ministry of Education in Ramallah have
been ransacked by Israeli troops, as has the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics.
NGOs engaged in medical support and youth-work have
seen their offices destroyed. Shopping centres have been damaged, electricity
transmission lines and water mains have been destroyed, and thousands of houses
have been wrecked or damaged.
None of this will directly limit the risk of
suicide bombings, but it will certainly have a major impact on the ability of
the PNA to run its own services when there is a military withdrawal.
Overall, the Sharon policy is one of dismantling
the apparatus of the Palestinian state that has been built up over the past
eight years. Indeed, one of the significant if subsidiary reasons why there is
so much anger in a number of European capitals is that much of this
infrastructure has been carefully developed with aid from EU states and is now
wrecked.
The
Lebanon experience
The parallels with the Israeli military action in
Lebanon in 1982 are highly relevant to current circumstances and give us some
idea of the likely consequences of the current operations.
Sharon launched Operation
Peace for Galilee on behalf of the Israeli government in the summer of 1982
in response to rocket and other attacks across the border from South Lebanon
and in the wake of an assassination attempt against the Israeli ambassador to
London. It was claimed initially to be a limited military operation designed to
produce a secure zone in Southern Lebanon: the war over the Falklands/Malvinas
islands between Britain and Argentina earlier that year was cited as an example
of the legitimacy of taking such action in pursuit of security.
In the event, it turned out to be the start of a
massive military operation by land, sea and air designed to destroy the
Palestinian military organisation in Lebanon. The invasion took the Israelis
right up to Beirut and resulted in the hugely destructive siege of West Beirut,
with more than ten thousand people killed, even before the massacres in the
refugee camps at Sabra and Chatilla later in the year.
Poorly-armed
Palestinian militia proved very difficult to overcome and international
pressure eventually forced an Israeli withdrawal from Beirut that also involved
the evacuation of Arafat and his militia to Tunis. The Israelis stayed in
occupation of southern Lebanon for several years but eventually withdrew from
much of the territory in the face of guerrilla actions by Hezbollah militia.
Resistance from the Palestinians in West Beirut was
greater than expected, and one response by the Israeli defence forces was to
make extensive use of artillery and air attacks. These were frequently deployed
in densely populated urban areas – one of the reasons for the high number of
deaths and injuries. Similar tactics are being used at present.
If the current operation was to continue to its
planned completion, there would be little left of the PNA infrastructure; yet
if negotiations were to become possible, then the Palestinians would be placed
in a real position of weakness. That, at least, appears to be the position of
the Sharon government, and would result, in the government’s expectations, in a
settlement in which control of the occupied territories would remain firmly in
Israeli hands.
Further suicide bombings would prompt further
substantial use of force, and Palestinian entities would be limited to a number
of weak centres of population heavily constrained by settlements, strategic
roads and appropriate military control.
Three
conditions of conflict
Although most international opinion remains deeply
critical of the current Israeli operations, Sharon retains support within
Israel, at least for this action, even if a substantial minority of the
population would prefer the rhetorically more extreme Binyamin Netanyahu.
The main and obvious reason for this support is the
deep-rooted effects of the suicide bombings on Israeli society, especially the
Passover massacres. This is compounded by the outlook of around one million
recent immigrants, mostly from Russia. Their presence has moved the Israeli
political scene further to the right, not least because their own perceptions
of insecurity are perhaps even greater than longer-established citizens.
There is therefore a combination of three factors.
One is Sharon’s own predisposition for hard military action and utter distaste
for compromise. The second is the level of domestic support, and the third is
the lack of any real pressure from the United States, even bearing in mind
George W. Bush’s recent statements. It will have taken Colin Powell seven days
to make the twelve-hour journey to Israel, allowing the Israelis sufficient
time to rush through their operations on the West Bank.
Israel
threatened from within
There appears to be an assumption, within both the
Sharon government and Israeli armed forces, that the current operation will
suppress Palestinian aspirations and allow greater Israeli control. This is
unlikely in the extreme. The Palestinians lost many thousands of people in
Beirut in 1982, about a thousand were killed in the first intifada and
another thousand had died in the uprising over the past eighteen months. None
of this destroyed their resolve to overturn occupation, and the current Israeli
action is likely to strengthen greatly the more radical elements.
Recent perceptive interviewing by some western
journalists with Hamas leaders in Gaza confirm that their analysis is that Israel is doing precisely what Hamas wants.
The intense military action, killing and injuring very many hundreds of
Palestinians, will serve to further radicalise opinion, bringing forward many
more people willing to die for their beliefs. In all probability, there will be
further and more extensive use of suicide bombings in the months ahead, as the
bus-bombing in Haifa has already shown.
There are two further factors that should cause
concern for anyone with the genuine security interests of Israel at heart. One
is the widespread assumption within Israel that Palestinian society is composed
of ill-educated religious extremists and that anyone who opposes Israel troops
in their actions is necessarily a terrorist. Nothing could be further from the
truth.
Palestinians in the occupied territories are
probably the best educated people in the whole of the Arab world, with a
remarkable network of schools and universities forming the basis of an intense
concern with education. Not only are they very well informed, and determined,
but they have at least as great an attachment to their country as the average
Israeli has to Israel.
The second factor is more ominous for the Israeli
security forces. In the last two weeks of intense fighting, Israel has been
fully dominant in its use of firepower, using tanks, artillery, bombers and
attack helicopters with near impunity. Yet it has proved difficult and costly
to take control of some of the Palestinian urban areas, as events in Jenin have
demonstrated.
Furthermore, there is little evidence of the
discovery of major arms supplies, and Palestinian militia have made little use
of some of the more effective weapons that they undoubtedly have.
Sharon’s very use of military force therefore
results in Israel being in a huge dilemma. If the armed forces units are
withdrawn from the main centres of Palestinian population, the militia will
re-group, the suicide bombings will continue and they may well intensify. If,
on the other hand, Israel maintains a high level of military occupation, it
will not only fly in the face of international opinion, but its military forces
will become persistently vulnerable to guerrilla attack, as was already
starting to happen up until last month.
There is, for Israel, a very uncomfortable
conclusion to be drawn from this use of force: as well as being tremendously
costly in human terms, it will actually be deeply counter-productive to the
security of the State of Israel.
In the final analysis, there is no alternative
whatsoever to Israel negotiating a full and just settlement with the
Palestinians. What appears currently to be the powerful and effective use of
force by the Sharon government is actually disguising a deteriorating security
environment for Israel and is the greatest obstacle to Israel gaining a
peaceful and secure future.
Copyright © Paul Rogers, 2002. Published by openDemocracy.
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Paul Rogers, Professor of Peace Studies at Bradford
University, is openDemocracy’s international security correspondent. The
second edition of his book Losing Control – Global Security in the
21st Century will be coming out in June 2002.
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